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67 
THIS WAY TO THE EGRESS AND OTHER 
REFLECTIONS ON PARTISAN 
GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS IN LIGHT OF 
LULAC V. PERRY 
Bernard Grofman* † 
After winning control of both houses of the legislature and the governor-
ship, Texas Republicans eventually succeeded in redistricting Texas’s 
congressional seats in 2003, replacing a 2001 court-drawn plan. LULAC v. 
Perry reviewed a number of challenges to that second redistricting. The de-
cision deals with a multiplicity of issues, including, most importantly, the 
standard for violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the nature 
of tests for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.  
While there are some clear holdings in the case, several of them reflect 
different combinations of Justices in the majority and, since there are six 
different opinions, it is hard to lay out a clear line of jurisprudence in this 
case, much less find a consistent theory of political representation that might 
be used to unify different areas of voting rights case law. Moreover, there 
are almost as many questions left unresolved by LULAC as there are ques-
tions answered. For reasons of space, however, in this essay I will deal only 
with the aspects of LULAC that are related to partisan gerrymandering 
claims. (I hope to write about the Section 2 aspects of the case in the future.)  
In partisan gerrymandering the recurrent issue has been whether Davis v. 
Bandemer’s 1986 holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are justicia-
ble has now been rendered moot by the failure of courts to find manageable 
standards that would both: (a) specify some type of metric to measure devia-
tions from equal protection for political parties and their supporters, and (b) 
offer a test to distinguish those cases where partisan unfairness had risen to 
the level of a constitutional violation from situations in which it should sim-
ply be regarded as politics as usual. Here I argue that, despite the continuing 
disagreements among the Justices about standards, and despite the finding 
that the 2003 Texas congressional plan was not an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander, taking the various opinions in toto, the LULAC Court has fi-
nally provided enough guidance to lower courts regarding what to look for 
in deciding future partisan gerrymandering claims—start with an inquiry 
into partisan bias—that there is good reason to believe that Bandemer is no 
longer a dead letter. 
                                                                                                                      
* Department of Political Science and Center for the Study of Democracy, University of 
California, Irvine. 
†
 Suggested citation: Bernard Grofman, This Way to the Egress and Other Reflections on 
Partisan Gerrymandering Claims in Light of LULAC v. Perry, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impres-
sions 67 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/grofman.pdf. 
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I write about LULAC as a political scientist who has testified in numer-
ous voting rights cases over the course of the past three decades, and who 
was the lead expert witness for the prevailing party in the two foundational 
cases decided by the Court in 1986, Thornburg v. Gingles and Bandemer, 
dealing with Section 2 and partisan gerrymandering, respectively. Although 
I was never involved with the original LULAC litigation in any way, I have a 
specific interest in LULAC in that I co-authored an Amicus Brief in the case 
(on behalf of neither party) with the Harvard political scientist Gary King 
and others. That brief, whose main ideas were referenced by five of the Jus-
tices in LULAC, argued that the interrelated concepts of partisan symmetry 
and partisan bias should be an integral part of any standard adopted by the 
Court for violations of equal protection involving partisan gerrymandering. 
Relatedly, in an earlier Amicus Brief (also on behalf of neither party) in a 
2003 partisan gerrymandering case, Vieth v. Jubilerer, University of Califor-
nia, San Diego political scientist Gary Jacobson and I argued that the impact 
of partisan gerrymandering was magnified in today’s harshly divided politi-
cal climate because the two parties are so evenly divided in their national 
political strength. Also, another article I co-authored reflecting my current 
views on the conditions under which minorities might have a realistic op-
portunity to elect candidates of choice is cited by Justice Stevens (joined by 
Justice Breyer) in LULAC. See B. Grofman, L. Handley, & D. Lublin, 
“Drawing effective minority districts: A conceptual framework and some 
empirical evidence, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1383 (2001). 
My views about how lower courts might draw on the various opinions in 
LULAC to craft standards for partisan gerrymandering are more fully laid 
out in my article with Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Test 
for Gerrymandering Claims after LULAC v. Perry—tentatively set to appear 
in the January 2007 issue of Election Law Journal (henceforth Grofman and 
King). Here I will merely make some observations about how LULAC dealt 
with partisan gerrymandering issues, focusing on the guidance LULAC pro-
vides to lower courts regarding how to deal with future partisan 
gerrymandering cases.  
(1) With respect to partisan gerrymandering, there are two clear holdings 
in LULAC. The first is that mid-decennial districting is not, per se, unconsti-
tutional. This is a finding that was expected by virtually all redistricting 
experts (myself included). The second finding is that districting done for no 
motive other than partisan gain is not per se, unconstitutional. This outcome 
was not so clearly predictable based on past precedent. Indeed, if race as the 
preponderant motive in redistricting was inherently unconstitutional, as the 
Court held in Shaw v. Reno, then why not treat partisan greed as equally 
illegitimate? But, partisanship is not a suspect category as race is, and the 
“expressive harms” theory used by Richard Pildes to justify Shaw does not 
really apply to partisan redistricting. Thus, a majority of the Justices held 
that improper partisan motivation alone was not enough. Indeed, the major-
ity held that even the combination of partisanship as the sole or predominant 
motive and a mid-decadal redistricting triggered solely by partisan concerns 
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does not create a constitutional violation absent a demonstration of imper-
missible effects that violate equal protection. 
(2) It might appear that, after ruling out two possible bases of partisan 
gerrymandering, the LULAC Court left partisan gerrymandering much 
where it was after Vieth in 2003, namely in an existentialist limbo, where 
justiciability is asserted but where no plan is ever struck down and no Court 
majority exists to specify appropriate standards and thresholds. In other 
words, with respect to a breakthrough in partisan gerrymandering case law, 
one might say, to paraphrase Jean Paul Sartre, that LULAC offers “no exit.” I 
believe, however, that LULAC is better thought of in terms of P. T. Barnum’s 
legendary circus signs: “This way to the egress.” Even if you’re not sure 
what an egress is, if you follow the signs you’ll eventually figure it out (no 
pun intended). And the necessary signs are indeed found in LULAC that will 
allow lower courts to lay out manageable standards for partisan gerryman-
dering by piecing together the insights in the opinions of Justices Souter, 
Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg and Kennedy—especially Kennedy.  
In particular:  
(a) After LULAC we can now clearly assert that measures of partisan 
bias (i.e., deviations from partisan symmetry: for definition see Grofman 
and King) will be a key component of any (prima facie) test for gerryman-
dering that might emerge in the future. Justices Souter and Ginsburg assert 
that “interest in exploring this notion [of partisan symmetry] is evident [in 
the Court];” and Justices Stevens and Breyer see partisan symmetry as “a 
helpful (though certainly not talismanic) tool.” While Justice Kennedy notes 
that that “asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional par-
tisanship,” Justice Stevens characterizes Justice Kennedy’s views as “leaving 
the door open to the use of the standard in future cases,” when used as part 
of a broader test—and I, too, read Justice Kennedy’s opinion in that way. 
(b) There are suggestions in LULAC that any test for partisan gerryman-
dering is likely to involve burden shifting at different phases of the inquiry, 
perhaps drawing on the approach laid down in Brown v. Thomson.  
(c) We might find partisan gerrymandering claims limited to cases where 
at least one election has been held under the plans being challenged. This 
would allow for a Court majority that could include Justice Kennedy. Justice 
Kennedy suggested that we could look at a partisan gerrymandering test 
retrospectively rather than prospectively so as to rule out purely hypothetical 
harms (a position that echoes earlier comments made by Justice Breyer in 
Vieth).  
(d) We might find use of comparative analyses of levels of partisan bias 
in past, present, and proposed plans. This is one way to address the issue of 
thresholds without actually setting precise numerical standards. Justice 
Kennedy made implicit use of comparisons of expected bias across plans in 
his discussion of why the 2003 plan should not be held unconstitutional. 
Also, such a comparative analysis suggests a potential natural parallel with 
how courts have dealt with measures of compactness to reach judgments 
about a plan being ill-compact, since there is no “natural” threshold for 
when a plan becomes ill-compact.  
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(e) Given the reluctance of several of the Justices to make direct analo-
gies with racial cases, I think we will see standards for partisan 
gerrymandering that are distinct from the standards used to judge vote dilu-
tion. I might note that, in my view, this is exactly what should happen (see 
Grofman and King). For example, an appropriate inquiry for Section 2 is in 
terms of packing and cracking of specific minority populations, with state-
wide considerations clearly subordinate, even if relevant. In contrast, in par-
tisan gerrymandering inquiries, to assist in manageability, the initial 
question should be about deviations from partisan symmetry judged state-
wide. In particular, only once a prima facie violation has been established 
based on some legally set threshold value (or comparison) of partisan bias 
need the inquiry shift to the district level to see if the observed biases can be 
justified in terms of neutral districting criteria and how best to remedy the 
equal protection violation by undoing some or all of the packing and crack-
ing that created the bias. 
(f) Now that the Supreme Court has finally provided some guidance to 
lower courts in how to think about partisan gerrymandering claims, after 
leaving them to wander in the wilderness for twenty years, I would antici-
pate that the case law in the area of partisan gerrymandering will evolve 
much as it has in other areas of voting rights such as “one person, one 
vote”—namely through the steady accumulation of precedent from lower 
courts confronting specific facts, with the Supreme Court clarifying incon-
sistencies that arise among lower court judgments and legitimating 
particular lines of attack after it has the wisdom of multiple trial courts to 
draw upon. Indeed, I see what the Supreme Court has done in LULAC as, in 
effect, offering an open invitation to lower courts to revisit the issue of parti-
san gerrymandering and to entertain challenges even in mid-decade if 
evidence from past elections under a plan cumulates to show strong evi-
dence of an equal protection violation. 
(g) With LULAC having apparently legitimated mid-decadal redistricting 
done for partisan purposes, and setting no limit on how many times a state 
may redistrict over the course of a decade, we might expect to see additional 
partisan mid-decadal redistrictings. But we should not anticipate a flood of 
such mid-decadal plans. First, only in states where there is unified partisan 
control can we have such redrawing. Second, even in such states, the inter-
ests of stable majority party incumbents, combined with the difficulties of 
making substantial partisan gains in states where there are only a limited 
number of congressional districts to “play with,” will limit change. Third, 
Texas was nearly unique in seeing a change in total partisan control in the 
state within a relatively brief time span.  
Still, in a handful of the larger states under unified control, partisan lust 
may manifest itself in the form of mid-decadal redistricting. Indeed, we may 
not have heard the last from Texas. Because of the urgency in creating a 
plan for the 2006 election to remedy the vote dilution, the LULAC court 
found there was not enough time for Texas to propose a lawful plan via leg-
islative channels. Thus the legislature could again use the excuse of revising 
a court-drawn plan to revisit the 2006 map in time for the 2008 election. 
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Indeed, there’s nothing in LULAC to prevent Texas Republicans from taking 
yet another bite at the redistricting apple in time for the 2008 election—say 
by adjusting some lines ever so slightly so as to make it easier to defeat one 
or more potentially vulnerable Democratic incumbents. They could almost 
certainly do this without running afoul of the Department of Justice’s exer-
cise of its Section 5 Voting Rights Act preclearance review, especially since 
the Bush administration, in preclearing the 2003 Texas congressional plan, 
has already demonstrated its willingness to allow political appointees in the 
Department to reverse the recommendations of the Voting Rights line staff. 
So, stay tuned. 
